W e use a controlled experiment to analyze gender differences in stereotypes about risk preferences of men and women across two distinct island societies in the Pacific: the patrilineal Palawan in the Philippines and the matrilineal Teop in Papua New Guinea. We find no gender differences in actual risk preferences, but we find evidence for culture-specific stereotypes. Like men in Western societies, Palawan men overestimate women's actual risk aversion. By contrast, Teop men underestimate women's actual risk aversion. We argue that the observed differences in stereotypes between the two societies are determined by the different social status of women.
Introduction
Evidence from Western societies suggests that women are more risk averse than men.
1 Such differences have important implications for economic outcomes such as occupational choice, investment and consumption choices, or insurance coverage. Findings from rural and traditional societies, however, cannot confirm the verdict of systematically different risk preferences of women and men (e.g., Binswanger 1980, Henrich and McElreath 2002) . Even novel and rare experimental work conducted in societies where the roles of women and men are mirror images in specific aspects of social norms provides only mixed results. Gneezy et al. (2009) observe gender differences in competition but not in risk preferences among the patriarchal Maasai in Tanzania and the matrilineal Khasi in India. Gong and Yang (2012) find that women are more risk averse than men in patriarchal and matrilineal societies in China but the gender gap is smaller in the latter one. These findings suggest that gender differences in risk preferences cannot unequivocally be attributed to nature. Rather such differences may also be culture specific and evolve during socialization. 2 In this study we go beyond the analysis of gender differences in risk preferences and examine gender differences in stereotypes about risk preferences of men and women. We do so by comparing two traditional island societies, which mainly differ in the social status of women: the patrilineal Palawan in the Philippines and the matrilineal Teop in Papua New Guinea.
Stereotypes play an ambiguous role in decision making. On the one hand, by highlighting differences between groups, they allow easy processing of information and categorization of people (Brewer 1999) . 3 On the other hand, stereotypes are necessarily 2 See Gneezy et al. (2009 Gneezy et al. ( , pp. 1644 for an intriguing discussion of the nature-nurture debate. Booth and Nolen (2012) also provide evidence for the role of nurture within a Western society. They show that English girls in an all-girls group or attending a single-sex school are less risk averse than girls in coeducational schools. 3 Stereotyping can be taken as the most cognitive component of category-based reactions, i.e., reactions to people from groups perceived to differ significantly from one's own (Eagly and Chaiken 1998, Petty and Wegener 1998) .
selective and highlight only the most distinctive features of a group (Hilton and von Hippel 1996) . They may hence be associated with biased assessment of an individual's actual risk preferences and ultimately lead to statistical discrimination. Whether one sex is, rightly or wrongly, stereotyped as more risk averse, has important and potentially adverse consequences for the opportunities, choices, and outcomes of an individual with that sex (e.g., Ball et al. 2010, Roth and Voskort 2014) . In an economic transaction with another party, it is often the risk preference perceived by the other party-not the typically unobservable true risk preference-that matters. For instance, Wang (1994) finds that investment brokers offer women lower risk investment options (with lower expected returns) than men, which is consistent with the stereotype that women are more risk averse than men. Women may then make different and potentially suboptimal investment decisions compared to a situation in which they would receive unbiased advice. Stereotypes may also cause the underrepresentation of women in higher management positions. Johnson and Powell (1994) find no differences in decision quality and risk propensity between female and male managers and argue that the exclusion of women from such positions may be based on false stereotypes derived from observations of the nonmanagerial population. Heilman (2001) comes to a similar conclusion arguing that gender stereotypes bias the evaluation of work performance against women and thus hamper women from climbing up the organizational ladder. Relatedly, Eckel and Grossman (2002) note that employers may offer women lower initial wages in employment negotiations and bargain more aggressively if they expect women to be more risk averse and hence more willing to accept a given offer than men. In the context of developing countries, gender stereotypes may explain why microcredits are primarily given to women rather than men (Morduch 1999) : if women are expected to be more risk averse, the perceived chances of debt retirement are higher.
While women in Western societies are often more risk averse than men, men perceive women to be even more risk averse than they actually are (e.g., Grossman 2002, 2008b; Daruvala 2007; Grossman and Lugovskyy 2011 ). Men's biased perception persists even if information about women's actual risk preferences is provided (e.g., Grossman 2013) . 4 Beyond statistical discrimination, incorrect stereotypes further worsen suboptimal decision making and the associated welfare and efficiency losses. This is especially so when stereotypes are internalized, thus lowering the self-esteem and confidence of the stereotyped group (Correll 2001 , Crocker and Major 1989 , Jones et al. 1984 , Rosenberg 1979 . 5 For instance, Carr and Steele (2010) show that concerns about their risk stereotype increase women's risk aversion in financial decisions. Following Akerlof and Kranton's (2000) identity model, the internalization of risk stereotypes may also explain women's occupational sorting into jobs that require relatively less risk taking.
Despite the wealth of literature on gender stereotypes, the existence of culture-specific stereotypes has, to our knowledge, not been investigated so far. This is somewhat surprising given the expected importance of culture in explaining the presence of stereotypes (Fiske 2000) . We use a simple gamble choice task based on the design of Grossman (2002, 2008b) to measure a subject's risk preference. To examine gender stereotypes in the patrilineal society of Palawan and the matrilineal society of Teop, each subject is asked to predict the gamble choice of another female and male subject from the same society. We are hence able to examine whether a person's sex is considered as a signal of risk preference in each society. Stereotypes change with the social structure and norms of a society, in particular with the status of groups (Crocker et al. 1998 , Fiske 2000 . We therefore expect gender stereotypes to be culture specific. Specifically, we expect men from the patrilineal Palawan to exhibit different stereotypes about female risk preferences than men from the matrilineal Teop. To address the internalization of stereotypes, we also analyze women's self-confidence and engagement in economic activities that are typically performed by men.
We find no significant gender differences in actual risk preferences in each of the two island societies. However, consistent with our expectation of culturespecific stereotypes, we are the first to show that men from a patrilineal society (the Palawan) overestimate women's actual risk aversion and men from the matrilineal society (the Teop) underestimate women's actual risk aversion. Hence, men in both societies use female sex as a signal for risk preferences, but in opposite directions. Men's biased perception of women's risk preferences implies suboptimal opportunities and choices for women. The fact that these biases are culture specific suggests that stereotypes are not universal by nature, but (co)determined by nurture.
Subject Pool: The Patrilineal Palawan and the Matrilineal Teop
Most explorations of gender differences in risk preferences are based on experiments conducted in what Henrich et al. (2010) call WEIRD (Western, educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic) societies. They make a compelling argument that these societies are relatively novel within evolutionary history and that data from non-Western small-scale societies are essential for testing hypotheses that relate to the human condition.
To assess the importance of culture for gender differences in stereotypes, we conduct experiments with subjects from small-scale societies where culture and its influence on the social order of a society play a more prominent role in daily life than in modern societies. We are thus more able to disentangle the role of culture from other factors related to economic development that may potentially confound the relationship between culture and stereotypes.
To isolate the effect of culture and women's social status on stereotypes, the ideal experiment would randomly assign different gender roles to otherwise identical societies. Such an experiment is, however, not feasible. To get as close as possible to this ideal experiment, we resort to the second best approach and conduct a cross-cultural study. Specifically, we study two societies that are very similar along many important dimensions but have opposite cultures when it comes to women's social status: the patrilineal Palawan in the Philippines and the matrilineal Teop in Papua New Guinea.
Both the Palawan and the Teop are originally indigenous tribes and live in small-scale island societies located in the Pacific Ocean. They share the same geoecological conditions and their remote location has limited exposure to external cultural influences. We can therefore exclude the possibility that differences in geography or climate drive both differences in risk preferences and gender differences in risk preferences. This setting is an improvement relative to the literature initiated by Gneezy et al. (2009) , which compares patriarchal and matrilineal societies that do not necessarily share geoecological conditions. In our two study societies, the social status of women and men is based on social norms that regulate land ownership and resource-related user rights. These norms are in favor of men among the patrilineal Palawan and in favor of women among the matrilineal Teop. The following paragraphs provide more details on each society.
The Palawan are an indigenous ethnic group of the Palawan archipelago in the Philippines. Our subjects were recruited from small coastal villages located in the Rizal area in the south of Palawan Island. Their main source of livelihood is farming and fishing.
Although the household is not strictly organized along patriarchal ideology, the husband is the publicly acknowledged head of a household and main decision maker. As such, he is expected to be the breadwinner for the family. Conversely, the wife is credited primarily for her ability to have children, take good care of them and her husband, and manage the household finances (Alcantara 1994) . Men hold user rights over land and other resources including those provided by the sea. Traditional leadership in Palawan communities is based on the blood line. Community members who have "royal" blood are eligible for leadership, but only if they are men (Limsa 2014) .
The Teop form a unique language group of Bougainville Island in Papua New Guinea and represent a matrilineal and matrilocal island society. Our subjects were recruited from small coastal villages located in the northern part of the main island. Similar to the Palawan, the mainstay of the Teop is farming. This subsistence pattern is supplemented by fishing, hunting, and foraging (Regan and Griffin 2005) . Women's social position in Bougainville culture has its origin in land. The matrilineal kinship structure gives women considerable power over material resources and activities that are economically and ritually important. Women's prerogative over land includes defining land boundaries, giving permission to hunt or to harvest timber, and the exclusive right to veto decisions on land-related matters. Although male relatives have rights to ownership, their rights are limited and conditional on female relatives' permission (Saovana-Spriggs 2003) . Moreover, unmarried, divorced, or widowed brothers and sons reside in the home of their female relative. Even married men who live with their wife's family are expected to spend much of their time in their mother's or sister's household. Still, there are some predominantly male domains. Women hardly participate in politics and do not physically take part in tribal or civil conflicts. Priesthood also remains a male profession. Moreover, the Teop rely on big men (chieftains) to enforce norms in everyday life (Cochrane 1970) .
Experimental Design and Procedure
Our experimental design closely follows Grossman (2002, 2008b) . We implement a simple and incentivized task for measuring risk preferences. This task is particularly adequate for a subject pool with limited numerical skills (Dave et al. 2010 , Charness et al. 2013 . Subjects are shown five gambles and asked to choose which of the five they wish to play for real. The gambles include one sure thing with the remaining four increasing linearly in expected payoff and risk as measured by the standard deviation of expected payoff. All are 50/50 gambles. Notes. Gambles increase linearly in expected payoff and risk as measured by the standard deviation of expected payoff; 1 Kina ∼ 0.4 US$. Gambles for the Palawan in the Philippines were adjusted based on purchasing-power parity.
associated with each possible outcome, expected payoffs, and the standard deviations of expected payoffs. The gambles are represented in a way that is easy for subjects to understand. The use of 50/50 gambles keeps the task as simple as possible.
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This design can also be used to measure a subject's gender stereotypes about risk preferences in a simple way. After subjects choose their most preferred gamble, we ask them which of the five gambles an unidentified female and male subject from their society had chosen for herself and himself. Hence, the sex of the other person is the only information that a subject has to make a prediction of that person's gamble choice. We use monetary incentives to encourage subjects to spend effort on their prediction.
The experimental procedure is the same for sessions conducted in the two societies. In each society, we collected data from several villages. 7 For each session, we recruited adult subjects in advance and asked them to come to a central place in the village (school, church, or community places).
8 After answering a short questionnaire, all subjects received a payment as an appreciation for completing the questionnaire and a show up fee to hold endowment effects constant. Together, these payments amounted to about US$1, equivalent to about a quarter of the daily minimum wage in each country. Subjects were then asked to move one by one into a private area where the experiment was conducted. The experimenter read out the instructions and explained the tasks. In the first task, subjects were asked to choose their preferred gamble. Each gamble was presented as a pair of money cards (see Figure 1 ). The chosen pair was then put into a bag and shuffled. Notes. Each gamble (see Table 1 ) was presented as a pair of money cards. Gambles increase linearly in expected payoff and risk as measured by the standard deviation of expected payoff.
Before subjects could draw their card from the bag, they were asked to complete the second task. In this task, subjects were shown two closed envelopes, one containing the gamble choice of an unidentified female subject and one containing the gamble choice of an unidentified male subject. Subjects were then asked to predict which gamble the other female and male subject had chosen for herself or himself.
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For each correct prediction, they received an additional payment.
11 Subjects were told that pairs in the envelopes were changed after each participant such that they could not use any information they could have potentially received from previous participants. As a final step, subjects drew one card from the bag with their chosen gamble and received their payment.
12 On average, this additional payment summed up to about US$1. a The wealth index is defined as the sum of assets owned. We consider the following six assets: torch, lamp, chair, generator, mobile phone, and radio.
b Note that we failed to record the educational level of two participants. We allocate these observations to education level two (elementary), the most common category.
To ensure that all subjects fully understood the instructions and could communicate with the experimenters, we hired local assistants. They translated our experimental instructions into the local language. Different assistants translated the instructions back into English, so we could check for accuracy. All instructions were read aloud to the subjects, first in English by the experimenter then in the local language by the assistant. Table 2 summarizes the main socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of the subjects from the two societies. In total, 103 people from the patrilineal Palawan (49 men, 54 women) and 96 people from the matrilineal Teop (48 men, 48 women) participated in the study. Several observations are noteworthy. First, the average age (41-42 years) is about the same across society and sex p = 0 49 .
Subject Characteristics
14 Second, households of Teop people are larger than those of Palawan people (6.03 versus 4.83, p < 0 01). The difference can be explained by the fact that married Teop men are still counted as members of their mother's household even if they reside elsewhere. Third, reflecting the different social status of women in the two societies, Teop women have a significantly higher educational attainment than Palawan women p < 0 01 . While all Teop women in the sample have completed some form of formal education, about one quarter of Palawan women have no formal education at all. However, Teop men and Palawan men do not significantly differ in their educational background p = 0 42 . Fourth, wealth, as measured by the number of comparable assets households own, is only marginally larger in Teop than in Palawan p = 0 08 . 15 We can find no significant differences in wealth between men and women within societies (p = 0 20 for Teop and p = 0 50 for Palawan). Fifth, farming and fishing are the main economic activities in both societies. However, wage labor, in particular as a secondary activity, is more prevalent in Palawan. Sixth, because of the strong presence of Christian missionaries in Bougainville, all Teop subjects are Christians, while about 35% of Palawan subjects are Muslims. Figure 2 shows the mean gambles that women and men choose for themselves separately for the patrilineal Palawan and the matrilineal Teop. Table 3 lists the distribution of gamble choices by sex and society in more detail. Across sex, Palawan subjects are considerably less risk averse than Teop subjects. The mean gamble choice is 3.43 among Palawan subjects and 2.73 among Teop subjects. The difference is statistically significant p < 0 01 .
Actual Risk Preferences
16 About 55% of the Palawan choose the risky gambles 4 and 5, compared to 31% of the Teop. By contrast, 44% of the Teop people select the less risky gambles 1 and 2, compared to 23% of the Palawan.
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Although the Palawan and Teop appear to have different risk preferences, we observe no gender differences in risk preferences within the two societies. We cannot reject the hypothesis that the gamble choice of Palawan (Teop) women equals the gamble choice of Palawan (Teop) men at usual significance levels (3.57 versus 3.29, p = 0 31 for Palawan; 2.67 versus 2.79, p = 0 61 for Teop).
To ensure that these findings are not confounded by different background characteristics of subjects across sex or society, Table 4 presents results from a simple regression model. We use ordinary least squares as expected payoff (and risk) increase linearly with gambles.
18 Columns (1)- (4) pool data from Palawan 15 We considered the following six assets, which are of comparable value and use across the two societies: torch, lamp, chair, generator, mobile phone, and radio. 16 All tests of gender differences in means are conducted using a Wilcoxon rank-sum test. Our results are robust to using a t-test. 17 Palawan men's mean gamble choice is significantly higher than those of Teop men and women (3.29 versus 2.79, p = 0 07 and 3.29 versus 2.69, p = 0 03). The same is true for Palawan women's mean gamble choice (3.57 versus 2.79, p < 0 01 and 3.57 versus 2.67, p < 0 01). 18 Our results are robust to using alternative estimators such as ordered probit (results are available upon request). Notes. Gambles increase linearly in expected payoff and risk as measured by the standard deviation of expected payoff. Table 3 lists the distribution of gamble choices by sex and society in more detail.
and Teop subjects. Columns (5)- (7) and (8)- (11) split the data by society, permitting the explanatory variables to have heterogeneous effects in each society. We include village fixed effects in columns (5)-(11). Estimation with village fixed effects only exploits variation within villages and eliminates all villagelevel heterogeneity (e.g., village economy, village leadership, village geography, or demographic composition). It can hence not be the case that some village-specific oddities drive our results. For each sample, we show three standard specifications. The first specification only controls for the sex of the subject. The second specification adds controls for age, education, 19 and wealth. The third specification additionally controls for religion, wage labor, and other potentially relevant socioeconomic variables. In addition to these three standard specifications, we present a fourth specification for the pooled sample and the Palawan subsample in which we include an interaction of the gender and Muslim dummy (columns (4) and (11)).
In no specification do we find evidence for significant gender differences in risk preferences. Consistent with previous experimental work in the lab (Holt and Laury 2000) and the field (Henrich and Notes. Gambles increase linearly in expected payoff and risk as measured by the standard deviation of expected payoff (see Table 1 ). Figure 2 shows the mean gamble choices by sex and society.
McElreath 2002), sex, age, economic status, and other characteristics do not predict risk preferences and the inclusion of these variables has no significant effect on the gender coefficient. In other words, differences Table 4 Own Gamble Choice (OLS Regression Results) Note. Gambles increase linearly in expected payoff and risk as measured by the standard deviation of expected payoff (see Table 1 ). a Predictions by Teop (Palawan) men for women (men) do not sum to total observations of 48 (49) because of three (one) missing values. We failed to record these predictions during the experimental sessions.
non-Muslims. This finding, however, cannot explain why the Teop are generally more risk averse than the Palawan. 20 In general, our findings are in line with results from previous cross-cultural studies that point toward the importance of culture for explaining variation in behavior (e.g., Weber and Hsee 1998 , Henrich et al. 2012 , Rieger et al. 2014 , Nelson 2015 .
Stereotyping About Risk Preferences
In addition to choosing a gamble for themselves, subjects also made a prediction of the gamble choice of an unidentified female and male subject. Table 5 presents the distribution of predictions of others' gamble choices by sex and society.
In line with the previous finding that Palawan subjects are less risk averse than Teop subjects, they also perceive themselves to be less risk averse. On average, all (female and male) Palawan subjects make significantly higher predictions of the gamble choice of both women and men than Teop subjects (3.36 versus 2.81, p < 0 01 for women; 3.19 versus 2.94, p = 0 10 for men).
Gender stereotyping is best assessed by comparing actual and perceived risk preferences for each sex. For this purpose, we define the prediction error as the difference between an individual's prediction of the 20 We checked for systematic gender differences within the Muslim and non-Muslim subsamples and found no significant differences. We also checked whether there are significant differences in the relationship between socioeconomic characteristics and risk preferences for Muslims by interacting each characteristic with a Muslim dummy. There appear to be no systematic differences. None of the interactions turn out to be significant at the 10% level (results are available upon request). gamble choice and the average actual gamble choice of a given sex: prediction error i sex = prediction i gamble choice sex − average actual gamble choice sex A prediction error of zero implies that stereotypes about risk preferences are on average correct. Accordingly, nonzero prediction errors are associated with incorrect stereotypes. Negative prediction errors correspond to overestimating, positive prediction errors to underestimating the risk aversion of a given sex. As argued above, the larger the bias in perception, the larger the degree of suboptimal decision making and the associated efficiency and welfare losses. In the spirit of the literature on cross-cultural differences, the equation above defines the prediction error at the society level. Alternatively, one could also define the prediction error at the village level to take into account variation across villages. In the appendix, we therefore also document the robustness of our results to defining the prediction error at the village, not society level. Prediction error for women's gamble choices
Women Men
Notes. The prediction error is defined as the difference between an individual's prediction of the gamble choice of an unidentified subject of a given sex and the average actual gamble choice of that sex. Positive (negative) prediction errors correspond to underestimating (overestimating) the risk aversion of that sex.
society. Consistent with the culture-specific social status of women, there are considerable differences in men's stereotypes about women's risk choices across the two societies. Men from the patrilineal Palawan overestimate women's actual risk aversion. Their mean prediction error for women's gamble choices of −0.49 is significantly different from zero p < 0 01 .
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By contrast, men from the matrilineal Teop underestimate women's actual risk aversion. Their mean prediction error for women's gamble choices of 0.51 is also significantly different from zero p < 0 01 . Hence, men's perception of women's risk preferences is considerably biased in both societies but in opposite directions. The magnitude of the bias is considerable, amounting to almost half a standard deviation of women's actual risk preferences. 22 We use a one-sample t-test to test whether prediction errors differ significantly from zero.
When it comes to women's stereotypes about men's risk choices, there are no such differences between the two societies. While Teop women slightly underestimate men's actual risk aversion, their mean prediction error of 0.21 is not significantly different form zero p = 0 24 . Palawan women correctly assess men's risk preferences. Their mean prediction error is close to zero −0 03 p = 0 88 .
Men and women in both societies have relatively accurate perception of their own sex' risk preferences. All prediction errors are small and not significantly different from zero. Accordingly, gender differences within societies only exist for stereotypes about women's risk preferences. The mean prediction error of Palawan (Teop) men is significantly different from the prediction error of Palawan (Teop) women (−0.49 versus 0.04, p < 0 01 for Palawan; 0.51 versus −0.21 p < 0 01 for Teop).
To assess the robustness of these results against potential confounders, we regress a subject's prediction error for a given sex on the subject's own sex and several control variables. We start with a model that pools data from the two societies. To identify culturespecific gender differences in stereotypes, all specifications include a dummy variable for belonging to the Palawan society, a dummy variable for being male, and their interaction. Table 6 presents the results for prediction errors for women's risk choices using the same model specifications as in Table 4 . All our previous results hold. There are significant gender differences in stereotypes about women's risk preferences. According to column (1), men from the matrilineal Teop underestimate women's risk aversion. The positive and significant coefficient of the male dummy implies that Teop men, compared to Teop women, overestimate the gamble choice of women by about 0.7. By contrast, men from the patrilineal Palawan overestimate women's risk aversion. Combined with the coefficient of the male dummy the highly significant coefficient of the interaction implies that Palawan men, compared to Palawan women, underestimate the gamble choice of women by about 0.5. Both the size and statistical significance of the point estimates are robust to controlling for age, education, wealth, religion, wage labor, and other socioeconomic control variables as well as for a subject's own gamble choice and prediction error for men's risk preferences (columns (2)-(4)). The stability of the gender coefficient across columns indicates that important observable characteristics cannot explain gender differences in stereotypes. Our results are essentially the same when we analyze the data separately for the Teop subsample (columns (5)- (7)) and the Palawan subsample (columns (8)- (11) Notes. The table reports OLS estimates. The dependent variable is the prediction error for women's gamble choice, which is defined as the difference between an individual's prediction of the gamble choice of an unidentified female subject and the average actual gamble choice of women. Positive (negative) prediction errors correspond to underestimating (overestimating) women's risk aversion. Other controls include household size, being a household head, marital status, and fishing as main economic activity. Gamble choice is an individual's own gamble choice. Prediction error (men) is the prediction error for men's gamble choice. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * * * , * * , and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
third specification for the Teop subsample (p = 0 102, column (7)). As documented above, among the Palawan, Muslims are significantly more risk averse than nonMuslims. To check whether Muslims also have systematically different stereotypes about women's risk choices, we included an interaction of the gender and Muslim dummy (columns (4) and (11)). Our results remain unchanged. Hence, religion in the form of Islam does not drive our results.
The results presented in Table 6 are robust to various alternative specifications such as estimation with ordered probit instead of OLS (ordinary least squares; see Table A .1 in the appendix), clustering standard errors at the village level instead of simple robust standard errors (see Table A .2 in the appendix), defining the prediction error at the village, not society level (see Table A .3 with robust standard errors and Table A .4 with standard errors clustered at the village level) 23 or estimation with a random effects model (results are available upon request). One may also be concerned that our dependent variable is bounded from below and above and at different values for each society (as the average actual gamble choice for women/men differs between the two societies). We address this concern by estimating separate Tobit models for each society, in which we use societyspecific bounds. Our results are also robust to this check (results are available upon request). One may also worry that subjects did not genuinely try to predict other subjects' gamble choices but just used their own gamble choice or the mean gamble choice (3) as their prediction. Given that the average actual gamble choice for women/men differs between the two Table 7 Stereotyping About Men's Risk Choices (OLS Regression Results) Notes. The table reports OLS estimates. The dependent variable is the prediction error for men's gamble choice, which is defined as the difference between an individual's prediction of the gamble choice of an unidentified male subject and the average actual gamble choice of men. Positive (negative) prediction errors correspond to underestimating (overestimating) men's risk aversion. Other controls include household size, being a household head, marital status, and fishing as main economic activity. Gamble choice is an individual's own gamble choice. Prediction error (women) is the prediction error for women's gamble choice. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * * * , * * , and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
societies, such predictions may systematically bias our results. However, our results are robust to excluding subjects who used their own or the mean gamble choice from the sample (results are available upon request). Table 7 presents the results for prediction errors for men's risk choices using the same specifications as above. In line with the descriptive findings, we do not find evidence for significant gender differences in stereotypes about men's risk preferences. Neither the male dummy nor the interaction with the Palawan dummy turn out to be significant (columns (1)- (4)). In addition, the point estimates of both coefficients are much smaller and relatively close to zero. The picture is the same when we look at the Teop subsample (columns (5)- (7)) and the Palawan subsample (columns (8)- (11)).
Discussion
In this section we briefly discuss why only male stereotyping about women's risk preferences is biased and why the direction of the bias differs between the patrilineal and the matrilineal society. We also explore the relationship between stereotypes and economic decisions. In particular, we look at occupational patterns and self-confidence in the two main subsistence activities, farming and fishing, which require different attitudes toward risk. Finally, we present an interpretation of not finding gender differences in actual risk preferences.
Although social norms that regulate the status of women differ between matrilineal and patrilineal societies, the division of labor is similar across the Palawan and Teop. In both societies, women do the housekeeping, gardening, and childcare. Men are the main providers of the family. Their activities usually include outside tasks that require a higher degree of risk taking and physical strength such as fishing, hunting, logging, house building, etc. Moreover, communal activities like leadership and religious services are dominated by males. Hence, women's behavior in risky tasks and public activities is hardly or not at all observable to men. As a consequence, men in both societies are more likely than women to make biased assessments of the other sex' risk behavior. This may explain why only men's stereotypes about women's risk preferences are biased and why there is no biased assessment of men's risk preferences in both societies.
The opposite direction of this bias between the two societies can be explained by the different social status of women. Women in matrilineal societies enjoy more prestige and respect than women in patrilineal societies. Importantly, they also have more control over resources and hence better abilities to insure themselves against potentially adverse consequences of risk taking. These differences may explain why women's risk aversion is underestimated by men from the matrilineal Teop and overestimated by men from the patrilineal Palawan.
We cannot directly test the effects of men's misperception of women's risk preferences on women's economic decisions. We can, however, provide suggestive evidence on how this misperception correlates with women's self-confidence in farming and fishing and their economic activities.
To measure self-confidence in fishing and farming, we asked all subjects to assess their fishing and farming skills relative to those of other villagers on a three-point scale as worse (1), about the same (2), or better (3). Fishing is a task that is associated with more risk, competition, and uncertainty in outcomes than farming in this geoecological setting. Figure 4 shows the mean self-confidence in fishing (upper part) and farming (lower part) by sex and society. Teop women and men are equally self-confident in their skills in both tasks. By contrast, Palawan women are significantly less confident in their fishing skills than Palawan men (1.61 versus 1.92, p = 0 01). There is no significant gender difference in agricultural skills. Hence, among the patrilineal Palawan, men's overestimation of women's risk aversion is associated with lower levels of women's confidence in a risky task like fishing. This result is consistent with internalized stereotypes, which may be the result of different socialization patterns in the two societies (Andersen et al. 2013) . These patterns of self-confidence are reflected in the patterns of economic activities across the two societies. While 42% of women from the matrilineal Teop Downloaded from informs.org by [134.245.88 .208] on 17 August 2016, at 09:26 . For personal use only, all rights reserved.
engage in fishing as their main or secondary economic activity, the corresponding figure is only 13% for women from the patrilineal Palawan (see Table 2 ). Likewise, the women-men ratio in fishing among the Teop is twice as high as the ratio among the Palawan.
Finally, our result of no gender differences in risk preferences provides further evidence for the impact of nurture. In line with previous experimental work conducted in traditional and rural societies (Binswanger 1980 , Henrich and McElreath 2002 ) sex is not a significant predictor of risk preferences. This may suggest that cultural factors that drive gender differences in Western and industrialized societies do not apply to traditional societies. This difference could potentially be explained by comparing the division of labor between traditional and Western societies after the industrial revolution. Sexual stratification coincided with increasing productivity, specialization, and complexity of society. The introduction of wage labor, the increasing scale of production, and the mechanization of agriculture has led to long-lasting changes in gender roles. With the expansion of economic opportunities and separation of work from the home, men became economically less dependent on women, while women became more dependent on men (Hartmann 1976 , Goldin 1995 . This development has caused gender differences in employment, income, and wealth and may explain why women in modern societies are more risk averse than men.
Nevertheless, one should not overinterpret our results as they are based on subjects from only two societies. While our research design and econometric specifications rule out many potential confounders, it remains difficult to identify culture as the only relevant explanation for the observed differences in gender stereotypes. For firm conclusions, more evidence from other paired patrilineal and matrilineal societies is needed.
Conclusion
Using a simple gamble choice task developed by Grossman (2002, 2008b) , we analyze gender differences in risk preferences and stereotypes in a patrilineal and a matrilineal island society in the Pacific. We find no gender differences in actual risk preferences among the patrilineal Palawan and the matrilineal Teop. However, we find considerable evidence for culture-specific stereotypes about women's risk preferences. Similar to men in Western societies, Palawan men overestimate women's actual risk aversion. By contrast, Teop men underestimate women's actual risk aversion.
Our findings suggest that nurture, which is reflected in the different social status of women in the two societies, affects men's stereotypes about women's risk taking. As perceived, not actual risk preferences guide economic transactions with another party, men's biased perception of women's risk preferences likely has adverse consequences for women. It may result in worse opportunities, choices, and outcomes for women, thus reducing efficiency and welfare.
Our findings may provide important information for policy makers. If gender stereotypes are indeed driven by nurture, or an interaction between nature and nurture, policy makers may focus on promoting more equitable gender models. Less biased socialization and education may then pave the way for a more equal treatment of women and men.
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Experimental Instructions (for the Teop in Papua New Guinea) Thank you for participating in this study. Here you have the 5 Kina for answering the questions in the interview you did. This is your money. Now we will play two small games and ask you some short questions. In the game you can earn some extra money. There is no right or wrong answer in this game and you cannot lose any money. The money will be paid in cash immediately after we have finished. How much money you make depends to a large extent on your choices. Now I am going to explain you how we play the first game. Please listen carefully and hold your questions until I have finished the explanations.
Part 1 Participant's Pair Selection. We will play the game using five different pairs of money cards.
Please have a look at these pairs of money cards. As you can see, each pair has different amounts of money on its cards.
Pair number 1 has one card with 4 Kina and another card with 4 Kina.
Pair number 2 has one card with 6 Kina and one card with 3 Kina.
Pair number 3 has one card with 8 Kina and one card with 2 Kina.
Pair number 4 has one card with 10 Kina and one card with 1 Kina.
Pair number 5 has one card with 12 Kina and one card with nothing on it. PE < −1 6 −1 6 < PE < −0 6 −0 6 < PE < 0 4 0 4 < PE < 1 4 PE > 1 4 Palawan (patrilineal) Notes. The table reports marginal effects. PE denotes prediction error as defined in Section 4.3 and used as dependent variable in main specification (Table 6) . Robust standard errors in parentheses. * * and * denote statistical significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
You can choose from these five different pairs one pair you would like to play. After you have chosen a pair, I will separate the cards and put them into this empty bag and mix them up. After mixing the cards, you draw one card from the bag and earn the amount of money that is on the card.
For example, let us consider you would choose pair number . I will separate the cards and put them into this empty bag. Now I am going to mix the cards. Then you would draw one card from the bag. In this case you would win . Here is another example, let us consider this time you would choose pair number . Again, I will separate the cards and put them into this empty bag. Now I am going to mix the cards. Then you would draw one card from the bag. In this case you would win . So to summarize, the money you earn depends on which pair of money cards you chose and which card you draw from the bag. You are free to choose any of the five different pairs of money cards but only one of them. Now I finished my explanations. Do you have any questions?
Okay, now take your time, look at the pairs, and select the one you would like to play.
Part 2 Participant's Guess. Before we draw your card we will play the second game, which is a guessing game. In this game you can also make some extra money.
Here I have two envelopes. Each envelope contains one pair that other people from villages in Teop had chosen to play. They played exactly the same game as you do here with us.
We also asked them which pair out of these five different pairs they would like to play. However, these people are not here today and after each game played, I change the pairs in the envelopes.
Inside this envelope there is a pair that a man from Teop had chosen to play. Which pair out of these five pairs do Table 6 . * * * , * * , and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Table 6 . * * * , * * , and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Part 3 Payout. Okay, now we look if your guesses were correct and we will play out the pair that you have chosen. First we compare your guesses with the pairs from the envelopes Now we are going to play out the pair that you have chosen.
This is the money you have won. Okay, my assistant will ask you a few questions on your views about some issues. This takes only 5-10 minutes. After finishing the questions you get your money.
Please do not talk about the game with your neighbors or other participants until we have finished the study here. Everyone should have the same chance to make his or her own choice in this game.
